How is the role of the Global South changing in the critical raw material market?
- The E-Waste Column
- Dec 31, 2025
- 11 min read
An introduction to the North-South power dynamics found in critical raw material supply chains and how these might be changing.
This newsletter was written by Teun Bastiaans and Christine Nikander for a collaboration between Palsa & Pulk and The E-Waste Column. It has been published in both “The Just Transition Newsletter” and “The E-Waste Newsletter”.
Mineral extraction from colonialism to neocolonialism
The term 'Global South' throws a large number of highly diverse countries into one pot and treats these as more or less uniform. It is therefore often “criticized for perpetuating colonial dynamics”. Its use can, however, be helpful “precisely because it captures th[e] potentially extractive relationship between rich countries, many of which were once colonial powers, and poorer countries, many of which were once colonies”.[i] This use of the term is particularly helpful in the context of metals, minerals, and other so-called ‘critical raw materials’, as there has been a long colonial history of Global North countries extracting and removing these resources from Global South countries.
Still today, we see neocolonial powers at play in the metals, minerals, and other raw materials sectors — with many old exploration rights and mining licences still in place for companies from the Global North active in Global South countries. Beyond this, it is commonplace to see resources extracted in the Global South at low wages or with little benefits to the local communities, only for the price of these materials to increase by a multiple when they are exported and have been processed into refined raw materials or used to produce expensive end products.[ii]
Sourcing raw materials from the Global South today
Across the board, there are high levels of geographical concentration when it comes to both the presence, extraction, and processing of critical raw materials. While Australia and Canada play a significant role in the global production of critical raw materials, “a large part of the risks and opportunities associated with increasing extraction and processing of [critical raw materials] will fall on developing countries, many of which are in the Global South”.[iii] According to the Heinrich Böll Foundation, “[t]he clearest risk for resource-rich countries in the Global South is that hunger for [critical raw materials] in the Global North increases all of the negative environmental and human impacts of mining by prioritizing supply at all costs”.[iv]
In this context, it is worth noting that in 2022, “70% of the world's cobalt supply was mined in” — and the EU sourced 68% of its cobalt from — the Democratic Republic of Congo. Also in 2022, over 23% of the copper used globally and 78% of the lithium used in Europe came from Chile. At the same time, 50% of the world’s nickel came from Indonesia and “70% of platinum, 89% of iridium, and 36% of manganese” came from South Africa.[v] To assure that no shortages in so-called “critical raw materials” arise, the EU and other Global North countries have been concluding different bilateral trade agreements over the past few years, aimed at sourcing CRMs from the Global South. One example of this is the EU-Chile Interim Trade Agreement.[vi]
New shift in power over to the Global South
The limited availability of critical raw materials in the Global North shifts the agency in these global value chains southwards. Countries in the Global North call the intercontinental dependency on critical raw materials a ‘strategic vulnerability’. Simultaneously, it gives countries in the Global South a crucial bargaining chip and agency within geopolitical relations. For example, the Lithium Triangle in Bolivia, Chile, and Argentina contains 53.43% of the known global lithium resources, a material fundamental in EV batteries.[vii]
Regions with an abundance of critical raw materials are high-interest areas for globally dominant actors. In line with this, neocolonial patterns persist within the extractive projects of critical raw materials in the Global South.[viii] Multinational corporations from the EU, the US, or China capture the majority of the added value, while local communities in Global South regions are left with environmental degradation and poor labour conditions (see Palsa & Pulk’s interactive tool to learn more).
These relationships are, however, likely to change in accordance with the volatile and rapidly changing world order.[ix] First examples of this can be seen in Global South countries that are able to break this neocolonial cycle and capitalize on their natural resources to obtain better bargaining power. For example, the Bolivian president declared lithium a ‘strategic resource’, nationalized the industry, and instated legislation to prevent foreign investments.[x] Moreover, international South-South cooperations are expanding and gaining traction and power, such as the BRICS or the African Union.[xi] These international partnerships help reshape the current hegemonic structure and oppose solely extractive activities, e.g. in the African Mining Vision.
Global initiatives changing the power dynamics in raw materials
In general, strong institutions are required to regain the power and profits of a country’s critical raw materials. Accordingly, government action has to be transparent, corruption eradicated or minimized, and institutions have to be able to achieve policy goals.[xii] Potential ways forward include nationalization of the resources, export restrictions, and national industrialization of the value chain. Such interventions are part of a long, multidisciplinary, and localized process towards stronger geopolitical power and a fairer redistribution of benefits within the critical raw material value chains.[xiii] Simultaneously, important caveats should be considered, such as domestic elite capture and the adverse effects of limited foreign direct investment and technology transfer.[xiv]
Shifts in geopolitical relations to the South can be seen worldwide and across different organizational levels. For example, Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is an intergovernmental organization that spans across countries in Africa and Latin-America, with the goal to strengthen their natural resource management through reinforcing national institutions.[xv] Moreover, the UN Secretary-General António Guterres launched the Panel on Critical Energy Transition Materials, in which over 100 countries are participating. (An in-depth substantiation of the panel’s work can be found here.) Based on the panel’s work, the UN published the UN Guidance for Action on Critical Energy Transition Minerals in June 2025.[xvi] Its goal is to promote sustainable raw material life cycles that reflect the needs for sustainable development in each specific context. While UN bodies have the power to propose top-down interventions, these policy plans can only materialize when they are met with bottom-up initiatives implementing these changes.[xvii]
Consequently, bottom-up initiatives can be a significant driver in successfully mobilizing counterhegemonic interests, although this is usually encountered with strong political resistance.[xviii] One key example of this are the Indigenous Communities in the Peruvian Andes, who oppose the extraction of raw materials in their territories through legal action.[xix] As another key example, labour unions for workers in the mining industries can be highly effective in negotiating improved working conditions — for example, as has been done in South Africa.[xx]
China’s growing dominance in raw materials
China plays a highly dominant role in the production of raw materials — as “most raw materials are refined in China”. In 2022, “China produced around 70% of rare earths, close to 65% of raw graphite, and around 30% of lithium” used globally. In line with this, “the EU currently sources virtually all its rare earths from China plus more than 90% of its magnesium needs”.[xxi] At the same time, China also “refined all the world's graphite, approximately 85% of rare earths, 70% of cobalt, 58% of lithium, and 42% of copper”.[xxii] It, therefore, goes without saying that China’s dominant market position has an influence on the market prices and the retail conditions.
As the Heinrich Böll Foundation puts it their paper titled Transatlantic Strategy on Critical Raw Materials: “The West is perceived by some to engage in patronizing interference in the Global South, projecting values and judging that certain regimes do not legitimately represent the interests of their people”. They argue that “[t]his puts China, with its characteristically amoral approach, at an advantage in the contest for [critical raw material] supply”.[xxiii]
The changing geopolitical reality in the mining for critical materials is demonstrated by the Chinese dominance on the African continent. China is a specific actor that is not easily categorized along the Global North-South division. However, the financial investments that are taking place in different African countries demonstrate their goal for local capacity-building and local processing of raw materials. For example, Prospect Lithium Zimbabwe opened a lithium processing facility to convert hard-rock lithium into concentrate. Additionally, Malawi is creating a special economic zone to transfer technology and infrastructure that stimulate the local titanium industry. While these extractive industries reinforce existing power dynamics that lead to labour precarity and environmental degradation[xxiv], they can also enable local job creation, infrastructure development and local market stimulation — the China-Africa collaboration could be seen as an example of this.[xxv]
Ways to keep the value from raw materials in the Global South
Countries in the Global South “are taking steps to retain more of the value of [critical raw material] supply chains, principally through export bans on raw materials”.[xxvi] In place of export bans, building up more local refining capacity in — and shifting more refining to — countries in the Global South could be one way of making sure these countries could see more of the value and prosperity created by the mining of metals, minerals, and other raw materials. Companies can play a key role in this by setting up facilities and investing in the refining in Global South countries.
Beyond this, when it comes to the sourcing of raw materials for the energy transition, it is important to keep social and justice questions in mind. It is also worth noting that “policies for the Global South lean heavily on engagement from the private sector”.[xxvii] For a just transition to be possible, many of the existing partnerships between Global North and Global South countries must be reimagined. In line with this, in their article for Social Europe, Bernhard Tröster, Simela Papatheophilou, and Karin Küblböck argue that: “In the short to medium term, [Europe must start] genuinely enforcing environmental and social standards in extractive sectors and actively supporting resource-rich countries’ efforts to move beyond unprocessed raw material exports, particularly in the Global South”.[xxviii] Setting up governance, conducting due diligence, auditing, monitoring, as well as reporting on supply chains play a core role in making this possible — and are examples of concrete actions companies can take.
Tröster, Papatheophilou and Küblböck also argue that: “Looking ahead, as Europe transitions toward a circular economy, [...] partner countries [in the Global South] must not be abandoned”. They explain that to achieve this “[t]he long-term shift from primary extraction to secondary material use must incorporate international cooperation on recycling technologies, waste management, and resource efficiency” and argue that “[o]nly by integrating these nations into future circular systems can the EU ensure an equitable and sustainable raw materials transition for all”.[xxix]
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About the authors
Teun Bastiaans studied sustainable development at Utrecht University. His interests include geopolitics, human-nature relations, and political ecology. Teun has conducted research on local economic incentives for farmers producing bamboo in the Eje Cafetero (Colombia), and on urban water security in Mexico City (Mexico). In the past, he has also collaborated with Palsa & Pulk to develop an interactive tool on the lifecycles of EV batteries.
Christine Nikander is the founder of the environmental and social sustainability consultancy, Palsa & Pulk. She frequently speaks and writes about the environmental and human rights issues that arise through global supply chains, the energy transition, and the mining of critical raw minerals. Christine studied law at the universities of Columbia (New York), Edinburgh (Scotland), and Leiden (the Netherlands). She has been writing The E-Waste Column weekly since 2022 and she co-created The E-Waste Learning Hub that was launched in September 2025.
About Palsa & Pulk
Palsa & Pulk is an environmental and social sustainability consultancy. It provides compliance, governance, policy, and strategic advice to its clients. Its work is mostly focused on supply chain governance, the just transition, circular economy, and human rights.
About The E-Waste Column
The E-Waste Column is a weekly column about e-waste, transition minerals, and critical raw materials. It touches on a range of topics including ESG, sustainable development, circular economy, EU law and policymaking, corporate social responsibility, the transition to renewable energy, the EU Green Deal, supply chain due diligence and auditing, human environmental rights, business and human rights, climate law, and corporate sustainability.
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[i] Jacob Mardel, Heinrich Böll Foundation, Transatlantic Strategy on Critical Raw Materials, https://us.boell.org/en/2024/03/06/transatlantic-strategy-critical-raw-materials, p. 7
[ii] Susan Nakanwagi (2023). Critical Minerals and the Global Energy Transition: Recognising Global South Perspectives, Global Energy Law and Sustainability, 4(1-2). https://doi.org/10.3366/gels.2023.0096; Stacciarini, J., & de Assis Fernandes Gonçalves, R. Jnr (2025). Energy Transition and Mining in the Global South. https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/n8m57_v1; Bleeker, R., Zhu, G., van Uffelen, B., & Wittig V. (March 2023). Green transitions?, How clean energy technologies in the Global North are fuelling extractivism in the Global South, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, Special Issue. https://share.google/NCoopceqQLX0aVicS
[iii] Jacob Mardel, Heinrich Böll Foundation, Transatlantic Strategy on Critical Raw Materials, https://us.boell.org/en/2024/03/06/transatlantic-strategy-critical-raw-materials, p. 7
[iv] Jacob Mardel, Heinrich Böll Foundation, Transatlantic Strategy on Critical Raw Materials, https://us.boell.org/en/2024/03/06/transatlantic-strategy-critical-raw-materials, p. 8
[v] Hertie School, Jacques Delors Centre, The Club Approach: Towards Successful EU Critical Raw Materials Diplomacy, https://www.delorscentre.eu/en/publications/critical-raw-materials-club
[vi] European Commission (2025). The EU-Chile Interim Trade Agreement (ITA) explained, https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/chile/eu-chile-agreement/eu-chile-interim-trade-agreement-ita-explained_en
[vii] U.S. Geological Survey, January 2023, Mining in the Lithium Triangle. https://greenstocksresearch.com/lithium-triangle/
[viii] Boafo, J., Dotsey, S., & Spencer, R. (2025). Energy transition diplomacy: The EU’s pursuit of Africa’s critical minerals for renewable energy at whose expense? Energy Research & Social Science, 127, 104213. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2025.104213
[ix] Stares, P.B., et al. (2020) Perspectives on a Changing World Order. Center for Preventive Action. https://www.cfr.org/report/perspectives-changing-world-order
[x] Ley 928 de 2017 (2017). LEY DE LA EMPRESA PÚBLICA NACIONAL ESTRATÉGICA DE YACIMIENTOS DE LITIO BOLIVIANOS – YLB. https://mineria.gob.bo/juridica/20170427-13-12-42.pdf
[xi] African Union (2009). African Mining Vision https://au.int/en/documents/20100212/africa-mining-vision-amv
[xii] Saha, S., & Sen, K. (2023). Do economic and political crises lead to corruption? The role of institutions. Economic Modelling, 124, 106307. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2023.106307
[xiii] Runganga, D., Ashworth, P., & Bharadwaj, B. (2025). Towards advancing the Global South’s understanding of mineral criticality: implications of the North–South geopolitical confrontations on critical minerals. The Extractive Industries and Society, 23, 101680. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2025.101680
[xiv] Chen, Z., Awan, U., Nassani, A. A., Al-Aiban, K. M., & Zaman, K. (2024). Enhancing sustainable growth in the global south: The role of mineral resource management, supply chain efficiency, technology advancement, and local downstream processing. Resources Policy, 100, 105451. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2024.105451
[xv] EITI (2025). Driving impact. https://eiti.org/driving-impact
[xvi] United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (2025). UN Guidance for Action on Critical Energy Transition Minerals, https://unece.org/sustainable-energy/publications/un-guidance-action-critical-energy-transition-minerals
[xvii] Eicken, H., Danielsen, F., Sam, J. M., Fidel, M., Johnson, N., Poulsen, M. K., Lee, O. A., Spellman, K. V., Iversen, L., Pulsifer, P., & Enghoff, M. (2021). Connecting Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches in Environmental Observing. BioScience, 71(5). https://doi.org/10.1093/biosci/biab018
[xviii] Terra Justa (2020) Defense of Territory and the Criminalisation of Social Protest in Mining Contexts in Peru.https://terra-justa.org/resource/defense-of-territory-and-the-criminalisation-of-social-protest-in-mining-contexts-in-peru/
[xix] Forest Peoples Programme (2021). Press Release: Indigenous Kichwa Community take Peruvian State and National Park to Court https://www.forestpeoples.org/publications-resources/press-releases/article/press-release-indigenous-kichwa-community-take-peruvian-state-and-national-park-to-court/
[xx] National Union of Miner Workers (2025). About us. https://num.org.za/
[xxi] Hertie School, Jacques Delors Centre, The Club Approach: Towards Successful EU Critical Raw Materials Diplomacy, https://www.delorscentre.eu/en/publications/critical-raw-materials-club
[xxii] Hertie School, Jacques Delors Centre, The Club Approach: Towards Successful EU Critical Raw Materials Diplomacy, https://www.delorscentre.eu/en/publications/critical-raw-materials-club
[xxiii] Jacob Mardel, Heinrich Böll Foundation, Transatlantic Strategy on Critical Raw Materials, https://us.boell.org/en/2024/03/06/transatlantic-strategy-critical-raw-materials, p. 10
[xxiv] Herzer Risi, L., & Doyle, C. (2023, July 18). Examining China’s impact on mining in Africa: Critiques and credible responses. Wilson Center. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/examining-chinas-impact-mining-africa-critiques-and-credible-responses
[xxv] World Bank (2025). Malawi Economic Monitor: The Rising Cost of Inaction and the Potential of Malawi’s Mining Sector. World Bank. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/malawi/publication/malawi-economic-monitor-the-rising-cost-of-inaction-and-afe-the-potential-of-malawi-s-mining-sector
[xxvi] Jacob Mardel, Heinrich Böll Foundation, Transatlantic Strategy on Critical Raw Materials, https://us.boell.org/en/2024/03/06/transatlantic-strategy-critical-raw-materials, p. 11
[xxvii] Jacob Mardel, Heinrich Böll Foundation, Transatlantic Strategy on Critical Raw Materials, https://us.boell.org/en/2024/03/06/transatlantic-strategy-critical-raw-materials, p. 13
[xxviii] Tröster, B., Papatheophilou, S., & Küblböck, K. (2025). Europe’s Critical Raw Materials Strategy Demands Equitable Global Partnerships, https://www.socialeurope.eu/europes-critical-raw-materials-strategy-demands-equitable-global-partnerships
[xxix] Tröster, B., Papatheophilou, S., & Küblböck, K. (2025). Europe’s Critical Raw Materials Strategy Demands Equitable Global Partnerships, https://www.socialeurope.eu/europes-critical-raw-materials-strategy-demands-equitable-global-partnerships
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